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Congressional Redistricting in California,
1965-67: The Quilting Bee and
Crazy Quilts
LEROY C. HARDY*
Like most states, California's government and politics have been
affected by the implications of Baker v. Carr,' Reynolds v. Simas,2
and Wesberry v. Sanders.3 In particular, the judicial requirement
of "one man, one vote" meant major changes for representation in
California. Responding to the Supreme Court's mandate, Cali-
fornia's state legislative districts were revised in 1965, with revo-
lutionary implications for the state senate.4 The congressional dis-
* Professor of Political Science, California State University at Long
Beach, Ph.D. University of California at Los Angeles.
This article was originally presented at the Western Political Science
Association meeting at Seattle in March 1968 and has been substantially
modified in light of subsequent events. This project was facilitated by a
research grant from the California State University-Long Beach Founda-
tion and a sabbatical leave during the Spring of 1967. The author is in-
debted to Professor Robert Hayes, Professor of Political Science, Cali-
fornia State University at Long Beach, for his constructive comments on an
earlier draft of this paper.
1. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
2. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
3. 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
4. For an analysis of the 1965 revision see Sohner and Hardy, Constitu-
tional Challenge and Political Response: California Reapportionment, 1965,
10 W. PoL. Q. 733 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Sohner].
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tricts that had not been realigned in 1965, despite the congressional
delegation's desires, were altered in 1967. In 1971, with five new
congressional districts allotted to California, and with new census
data, the reapportionment process began anew. The result of the
1971 reapportionment efforts was an impasse, with Democratic
legislative bills vetoed by the Republican governor. Eventually
the courts were drawn into the struggle, with the distinct possibility
that the courts would be drawing the district lines in 1973.
This article has two purposes: first, to trace the development of
proposals for congressional change from inception to approval
between 1965 and 1967; and, second, to give some insight into the
actual operation of a reapportionment process. Unfortunately
the bulk of articles about redistricting ignore or pass over quickly
the reality of the process in which the incumbents quilt from their
own aesthetic senses leading to what some call crazy quilts. This
terminology is appropriate because the creation of a redistricting
bill is comparable to a quilting bee. In contrast to the frequent
legalistic and statistical surveys of redistricting practices this
report will have some of the features of an inside report of a
participant-observor. This is possible because of the writer's deep
involvement in the creation of the 1965 and 1967 proposals for
realignment.5
This study also has immediate relevance because it indicates the
techniques that made possible a successful congressional realign-
ment in 1971 with the approval of 32 of 38 incumbents in contrast
to the rejected proposals for state legislative districts.
DEVELOPMENT OF A BILL
Background: California has repeatedly reaped a bounty of new
congressional seats, most notably in 1931 (9 seats), 1951 (7 seats),
and 1961 (8 seats).( Resulting reapportionments have been char-
acterized as reeking of gerrymandering.7 In 1951 the Republicans
5. The writer's reapportionment experience includes the following: As-
sistant to the Consultant of the Reapportionment Committee in 1951; Ph.D.
dissertation on the 1951 reapportionment; Consultant to the Reapportion-
ment Committee in 1961; Consultant to the Governor (1964-1965) re:
Senate and Assembly reapportionment; Consultant to the Congressional
delegation in 1965 and again in 1966-67; Consultant for the City of Newport
Beach redistricting in 1966; member of Los Angeles Mayor's Committee on
Redistricting in 1962; and Consultant to the Congressional delegation in
1970-71.
6. L. HAPDY, CAiromNA GoVERNmENT, 10 (2nd ed. 1962) [hereinafter
cited as Hardy].
7. L. Hardy, The California Reapportionment of 1951, 1955 (unpublished
dissertation in University of California at Los Angeles Library); H.F. WAY,
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had their opportunity when they won six of the seven new districts.8
Another recently realigned district also went to the Republicans.
The effectiveness of Republican efforts is amply demonstrated by
the election results in the 1950's in Los Angeles County. With 51
percent of the vote in 1954 the Republicans won 66.6 percent of the
representation. In other parts of the state the election and repre-
sentation percentages were closer, probably because required group-
ing of whole counties limited electoral manipulation.
In 1961 the Democrats had their opportunity, with seven of the
eight new districts swinging their way as well as two realigned
districts. The subtlety of gerrymandering is again revealed most
graphically in Los Angeles County. In 1962 with 49.85 percent of
the vote the Democrats won 66.7 percent of the representation.
Whereas the disparities of 228,712 to 451,322 in Los Angeles County
(average should have been 352,874) gave the Republicans advan-
tages in 1951, the disparities in 1961 with three exceptions were
within a 5 percent range.9
Evaluation of the 1951 and 1961 reapportionments has often
centered around the extreme disparities and reflects a certain
naivete. Specifically the disparities, often the extreme examples,
were caused by peculiarities of constitutional provisions. In par-
ticular, whole counties had to be considered outside of the multi-
district counties, and within multimember counties whole Assembly
districts had to be used in the creation of Congressional Districts.
To focus attention on the 28th Congressional District or the 71st
and 76th assembly districts, the disparities offer little insight into
the total picture, although there is little doubt that gerrymandering
was involved in both the 1951 and 1961 reapportionment.
In 1965 and again in 1967 the state legislature had an opportunity
to rectify the disparities. Implicit in the quest for "one man, one
vote" the cumbersome constitutional provisions would be set aside
-but would the unfettered political factors produce the desired legal
effect? One is reminded of the observations made about the federal
system:
California: Brutal Butchery of the Two-Party System?, in THE PoLiIcs
OF REAPPORTIONmENT, 249 (1962).
8. See Hardy, supra note 6 at 10.
9. REPORT OF THE ASsEMBLY INTERIM COMMITTEE ON ELECTIONS AND
REAPPORTIONMENT 1961 29 (State Printing Office 1961).
Social structures and processes are relatively impervious to pur-
poseful change. They also exhibit intricate interrelationships so
that change induced at point "A" often produces unanticipated
results at point "Z".... Changes introduced into an imperfectly
understood system are as likely to produce reverse consequences
as the desired ones.10
Activity in 1965: Five State Legislators had moved up to the
Congressional level in 1962 and in 1963 at the special election another
joined them so that by 1965 thirteen of the thirty-eight man dele-
gation had State Legislative experience, most of them fully cog-
nizant of what redistricting can do to a man's career.1 It is not
surprising that several Congressmen recognized legal rules that
would upset the current situation. Soon after the Wesberry case12
the implications for California congressional delegations were espe-
cially apparent. A committee of Democratic members (chaired by
Harlan Hagan, with Phillip Burton being the most active partici-
pant) investigated the problems, their possible solution, and the
creation of a workable program. A consultant was hired, and
negotiation was initiated among incumbents to achieve a package
for presentation to the state legislature which would have to pass
any such proposal.
At that time, the Congressmen who were more interested than
others were not incumbents who felt comfortable with their ma-
jorities or whose districts were equitable. Naturally those Con-
gressmen whose districts were safe preferred to leave matters as
they were: 'Why bother me?" But those with marginal districts
or special problems (e.g. adverse ethnic or racial concentration) or
with light or heavy populations that meant major shifts, were
sympathetic to some realignment to the degree of their understand-
ing of the problem.
The Political Situation: In 1965 the Democrats were still in their
golden era in California. They held the governorship, as well as
most statewide offices, and comfortable legislative majorities.
Twenty-four of the thirty-eight Congressmen were Democrats. It
is not surprising that impetus for action came from the Democrats
anxious to solidify their positions, while Republican Congressmen
10. Goals for Americans, REPoRT or =H PREsIDENT'S CoMlWIssxou ON
NATIONAL GoALs 276 (Colum. U. 1960).
11. Congressmen Harold T. Johnson, John F. Moss, Charles S. Gubser,
John J. McFall, Cecil R. King, H. Allen Smith and Glenard P. Lipscomb
who served before 1962 had previous state legislative experience. Five
other state legislators joined them in 1962: Robert L. Leggett, Augustus F.
Hawkins, George E. Brown, Jr., Charles H. Wilson and Richard T. Hanna.
The untimely death of Glenn Coolidge prevented the number from being
six. At a special election in 1963 Assemblyman Phillip Burton joined the
group.
12. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S, 1 (1964).
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at that juncture could only work out arrangements in cooperation
with the Democratic majority.
However, the Democratic Party was far from unified. Besides,
Jesse Unruh, Speaker of the Assembly, was focusing upon the
rivalries with the Democratic Governor and State Senate and
Assembly reapportionment, which vitally affected his power base.
Interested though he was in reapportionment, the Governor was
in no position to force through the legislature a redistricting bill.'3
Unruh's stance was supported by the belief that Congresssional
reapportionment might not be required and that the existing lines
maximized Democratic strength. At the same time that he en-
couraged a no-change position, the Speaker's lieutenants were made
available to Congressmen. They promised to provide data as a
device that might short-circuit the gathering of alternative ma-
terials and might make the Congressmen dependent on the Speaker's
resources.
Utimately a Congressional plan emerged to bring Congressional
Districts within the 15 percent variation. In general this was a
program that protected incumbents. The most notable changes
occurred in San Bernardino, Sacramento and San Francisco counties
and in districts that absorbed surplus population in the 28th Con-
gressional District. In these negotiations Congressman Phillip
Burton played an important role. His crusade-like furor to get
a package and his expertise in reapportionment were instrumental
in consummating agreement among many reluctant actors, but not
without later ramifications.
Congressmen Hagan and Burton went to Sacramento armed with
a program that they hoped would persuade the State Legislature to
adopt the Congressional proposal. The results were fruitless. With-
out a court order, with a belief that the proposal was not to Demo-
cratic advantage (especially in the 28th district) and that it did not
sufficiently help the Speaker's proteg6s in the Congress, the state
legislative leadership ignored the proposal. The matter was com-
plicated by the longstanding rivalry between Unruh and Burton.
The older Burton in the Assembly and his brother who won the
13. The writer at that time was serving as consultant to the Governor
on reapportionment (with special attention to senatorial reapportionment)
and also as consultant to the Democratic members of the California con-
gressional delegation.
20th Assembly District after Phillip Burton's departure to Congress
had long been Unruh's unbreakable foes in the state legislative
power structure. The Unruh hostility and suspicion of anything
promoted, which was shared by many other legislators, did not
help the 1965 Congressional program. Moreover, the Congressional
delegation was far from united in its presentation. Many preferred
to "let Jesse take care of the situation." Failure to act temporarily
put a quietus on Congressional redistricting.
When the matter did reach the State Supreme Court in July,
1965, the opinion stated:
We are, therefore, of the opinion that the Legislature should have
an opportunity to consider the question of Congressional districting
in the light of the standards set forth in Silver v. Brown, ante,
page 270, 279-280 (46 Cal. Rptr. 308, 405 P. 2d. 132). Accordingly,
the petition is denied without prejudice to the right to seek similar
relief if the Legislature has not enacted a new Congressional dis-
tricting measure by the close of its regular 1967 session.14
What did the court mean? One group said it meant action or
else. Another group equally believed that it meant that the court
would not interfere. The latter view was continually thrown up
to the action group: "I know one of the justices on the court, and
he says they don't want the problem." Although that view con-
tinued until the signing of the bill in December, 1967, it ignored
the prevalent trend of court decisions throughout the nation. In his
testimony on May 12, 1967, Assistant Attorney General Charles
Barrett said:
There is little doubt that if this session of the legislature does not
enact a Congressional redistricting statute Phill Silver, the peti-
tioner in the above mentioned case, will seek relief from the
California Supreme Court. It seems most probable that the Court,
pursuant to such a petition would take steps to insure that the
1968 elections were held under reapportioned districts. It could
well be that the Court would draw suggested districts which the
Secretary of State would be required to follow under the legislature,
prior to the time of election, redistricted in a constitutional
manner.15
But politicians are seldom detoured by the facts.
In the summer of 1966 interest in redistricting was renewed and
the Democratic delegation again engaged a consultant. The com-
mittee was again chaired by Congressman Hagan, and the other
members were Burton and Thomas Rees. The latter was a new Con-
gressman who had formerly been an Assemblyman and State Sen-
ator. In the Senatorial reapportionment of 1965 when he was State
14. Silver v. Brown, 63 Cal. 2d 316, 318; 46 Cal. Rptr. 531; 405 P.2d 571(1965).
15. Statement made to the Senate Committee on Elections and Reappor-
tionment on May 12, 1967, author's files.
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Senator from Los Angeles, his role had been important, and his in-
terest in reapportionment was more than casual.16
With the 1966 election pending, the consultant's work was primar-
ly involved with collecting registration figures for Los Angeles and
Orange counties. Preliminary adjustments could be anticipated on
the basis of previous plans and the expectation was that all incum-
bents would be reelected.
Nevertheless, unfortunately for defeated incumbents, the 1966
election was disastrous for the Democratic Party. In the Reagan
landslide that captured the governorship, all statewide offices, with
one exception, went to Republicans. A tenuous Democratic ma-
jority was maintained in the State Assembly and the State Senate,
but primarily on the basis of malapportionment practices in their
districts. The total Republican vote for the Assembly contests was
53.7 percent, the State Senate 50.1 percent and the Congressional
53.1 percent. The Republican Party won 47.5 percent of the seats
in the Assembly, 47.5 percent in the State Senate, and 44.7 percent
of the California delegation in the House of Representatives.
Specifically, three Democratic incumbents (Cameron, Hagan and
Dyal) had been replaced by three Republicans. On the assump-
tion that the previous proposals favored by Democrats in those dis-
tricts would not be favorable to Republicans, the 1965 plans seemed
undesirable from the Republican point of view. At the same time,
the Unruh position was reinforced by the 1966 results, and any
change in the three lost districts became less desirable to the Dem-
ocrats. But Democrats who had survived the 1966 sweep took a
second look at the 1965 proposals. Republicans began to speculate
not only on how to protect their new members but also on how to
prepare realignments to their party's benefit. Some Republican
Congressmen from safe districts were willing to keep several mar-
ginal districts as long as their own districts were perpetuated.
Fundamental to the political movement of a bill was the division
of the executive and legislative branches in Sacramento. Obviously
a Republican executive would not approve a Democratic proposal
16. Assemblyman Thomas Rees entered the House of Representatives as
a result of a special election in 1966. Later another Assemblyman (Jerome
Waldie) joined the State legislator contingent of Congressmen, making
a total of 15 among the 38 at the time of the 1967 reapportionment. Rees'
involvement in the 1965 reapportionment is covered in Sohner, supra note
4.
to the sole advantage of the Democrats; similarly, a Democratic
legislature would not be expected to approve a Republican redis-
tricting to the detriment of some Democratic Congressmen. Any
proposal would have to be bipartisan and realistic enough to ben-
efit incumbents. Despite this logic many of the legislators, pre-
sumably astute politicians, ignored it until the very end.
Developing a 1967 program: The initial reaction to the 1966 elec-
tion and its aftermath was "Let's not do anything." The consultant
was informed in January that his services would not be needed.
In the Democratic delegation the word spread by Congressmen close
to Unruh was that the Assembly leadership did not want the reap-
portionment issue to complicate what would, in any case, be an
acrimonious session. Also implicit was the consolation that the As-
sembly and State Senate committees would be available in case of
emergency. However, by the middle of February the consultant
once more was engaged and so began an arduous experience for this
political scientist. Congressman John McFall had assumed the
chairmanship of the Democritic reapportionment committee which
had been expanded in numbers. Congressman H. Allen Smith
assumed a similar position within the Republican delegation.
On May 12, 1967, George H. Murphy, Legislative Counsel, made a
statement before the Senate Committee on Elections and Reappor-
tionment pointing out:
The Legislature has not yet been expressly directed by a court to
reapportion Congressional districts. When the California Supreme
Court, in Silver v. Brown was asked to consider this question, it
refused to decide the matter, stating, as it did in the case of the
legislative districts, that the Legislature should first have an oppor-
tunity to consider the question. The Court stated that if the Legis-
lature did not enact legislation to reapportion the Congressional
districts by the end of its 1967 Regular Session, the court would
take jurisdiction and decide the matter itself.
In substance, the court thus told the Legislature that it must act
at the current session if it wishes to avoid a redistricting by the
courts.1 7
Thus, a reapportionment was to be anticipated. Murphy went on
to discuss guidelines, concluding that the court would follow its
1965 recommendations, namely: 1. no district may depart from the
ideal size by more than 15 percent; 2. a majority of the members
must be elected by the voters of districts containing at least 48 per-
cent of the population of the state, and 3. that reapportionment
should be based on the 1960 federal decennial census.
After reviewing similar cases in other states, especially Texas,
17. Statements made to the Senate Committee on Elections and Reap-
portionment on May 12, 1967, author's files.
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the Legislative Counsel opined that
[t]he legislature should set its sights at a maximum population
variance of five percent in the formation of Congressional districts,
with greater variances being tolerated only where necessary to
maintain the integrity of the boundaries of a political subdivision.
In no case do we have any basis for concluding that a variance in
excess of 10 percent would be permitted.' 8
This perspective of 15 percent shifted to 10 percent to potentially 5
percent, either of which complicated further the changing political
realities. At first blush the adjustment of an additional 5 percent
(involving approximately 20,500 people) might seem minor. How-
ever, whereas 28 districts had to give-and-take to achieve a 15 per-
cent, 35 districts had to be adjusted to achieve a 10 percent shift.
Always present is the potential ripple effect that draws an analogy
between the effect of a stone thrown into a lake and the shifts in
reapportioned districts. When it is said that six districts are over-
populated and three districts are underpopulated, there is no
simple solution in giving surplus population to a small district.
The change of population to an adjacent "equitable" district (one
initially within the range) may make that district overpopulated,
or underpopulated, and that in turn makes the next district over-
populated or underpopulated and so on. For example the 9th, the
8th, and the 7th Congressional Districts were underpopulated while
the 10th and the 11th Congressional Districts were overpopulated.
Given the county lines, geographical terrain and population con-
centrations, the 7th C.D. had to expand into the 8th C.D. (potentially
endangering the incumbent registration percentage, as well as ra-
cial balance). The removal of population from the 8th C.D. further
underpopulated that district. Consequently it had to expand into
the 9th C.D. which, in turn, had to expand into the 10th C.D. that was
overpopulated. However, since the 10th and 11th C.D.'s were heav-
ily Republican, adjustments became political as well as statistical.
If, because of underpopulation, the 10th C.D. required expansion,
this could be accomplished by addition of part of the 11th C.D. to
the 10th C.D. If the sections removed were Republican, the result
would weaken the Republican hold in the 11th C.D., or if Republican
areas were given to the 9th C.D. the Democratic position would be
jeopardized in that district. The ultimate result gave the 9th C.D.
Democratic parts of the 11th C.D. (breaking county lines) and
18. Id.
moved the 10th C.D. into the 12th C.D. that, in turn, had to move
into the 18th C.D. etc. The ripple had traveled some two hundred
miles.
In March there occurred a shift crucial both in perspective and
in methods of operation. It was not a deliberate, or even a con-
scious action but was de facto.
First, the Democratic desire to save the three lost districts be-
came more remote. As one Democrat said:
Earlier in the year it was hard to think of undercutting the come-
back chances of Democratic colleagues who'd gone down last
November. But as the '66 elections got more distant and Demo-
cratic prospects for '68 kept looking worse, we all decided that the
first law of politics is survival.19
Specifically, whereas the 1965 proposals gave Republican sections
of the San Bernandino County to a Republican, the 1967 proposals
found Democratic sections being given to a Democrat, John V. Tun-
ney, to improve the position of freshman Republican Jerry Pettis.
The 1965 proposal for no adjustment in the Democratic 25th C.D.
gave way to the massive shift of Republican sections in Orange
County to protect freshman Republican Charles Wiggins. This
aided Democrat Richard T. Hanna by removal of the Republican
areas. The 18th C.D. was subject to many variations, the final
action being the removal of Kings County (home of the former
Democratic Congressman Hagan) from the district of Republican
Robert Mathias.
Secondly, the role of the consultant underwent a significant
change. In 1965 he was engaged to gather data and make nominal
suggestions. He was supposed to provide an aura of respectability
to what otherwise might have seemed unscrupulous action. The
negotiations were carried on by actively interested Congressmen,
most notably Burton. After March of 1967 the consultant assumed
an active role in assembling the diverse interests into a manageable
package. From a staff position for the Democratic members his
role had changed to that of synthesizer for the entire delegation,
Virtually all Congressmen were dealt with individually. Some pre-
ferred not to become involved, especially where no changes were
anticipated. A few Congressmen were not very communicative be-
cause they assumed the consultant was too close to Burton. Several
Congressmen had to be interviewed several times. Some asked for
detailed information, e.g. exactly what percentage of a district was
Democratic or Republican, what percentage Negro, what percentage
loyal to what party? After untold hours and several trips to Wash-
19. Wall Street Journal, November 9, 1967.
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ington, the consultant emerged with a program within a 10 percent
variation with three minor exceptions, each of which involved
grouping of whole counties.
By early June the state legislators involved in reapportionment
were invited to go to Washington for a discussion of the Congres-
sional proposal. The first to arrive was Assemblyman John Fen-
ton, Chairman of the Assembly Elections and Reapportionment
Committee, with several of his fellow committee members. Fenton
and his group fanned out to learn individual Congressional stands
and to review the proposals. In contrast to Fenton's informational
exploratory trip, State Senator James Mills, Chairman of the State
Senate Elections and Reapportionment Committee, with Louis
Sherman, Vice Chairman, arrived in June with semiconcrete pro-
posals, notably his insistence that the variations come within 5 per-
cent.
As a result of the Mills visit, the perspectives shifted again. Mills
indicated that he meant to submit a bill that would generally con-
form to the Congressional wishes. But this expressed intention and
its presentation of alternatives (frightening in some cases) served to
break down resistance to action and caused several remotely inter-
ested Congressmen to consider how a reapportionment could affect
them. In particular, the alternative Mills proposals for the San
Joaquin Valley (one of which gave rural Congressman B. R. Sisk
an urban district made up predominately of valley cities) and the
Central Coastal area focused attention on the need to break county
lines to achieve a 5 per cent variation. In contrast to the Assembly
no-action or no-program stance, Mills indicated that there would be
action at least in the state senate, where a program would be put on
the books. This tactic was not in accordance with the ideas of the
state assembly leadership. Mills' initiation of a concrete proposal
had considerable potential. Courts in some states had picked up a
legislative proposal from one house as a solution to inaction by the
whole legislature. The California court would have a ready-made
solution with the Mills proposal on the books. It also put Mills, a
close ally of the Speaker, in an independent role as a state senator.
In cooperation with the Congressmen the consultant set out to
develop a 5 percent variation plan, again with some minor excep-
tions. There was not full agreement, but the consultant carried
with him the Congressmen's proposals, which were in some cases
incompatible. In Sacramento, he worked closely with the State
Senate staff in the preparation of the Mills bill. That bill (Senate
Bill 130) included a few variations from the Congressional plan, be-
cause it involved the settling of incompatibilities.
As the Mills bill emerged it contained sufficient discrepancies to
prompt a vigorous Republican attack. For instance, Congressman
Charles S. Gubser challenged the inclusion of 25,000 people from
San Mateo County in his 10th C.D. The accepted Congressional
proposal left San Mateo County (the l1th C.D.) intact, although it
was overpopulated by 30,000. Mills' bill shifted approximately
25,000 of these predominately Republicans to the 10th C.D. Not
only did this break county lines, but the removal of Republican
voters boosted the Democratic opportunity in San Mateo County.
The recent death of Republican Arthur J. Younger, with a special
election in the offing, added an emotional dimension to the con-
troversy. Although the Santa Clara-San Mateo problem was the
focal point of attack, other Republican Congressmen chimed in.
Congressman Pettis discovered that the lines in the Mills plan did
not agree exactly with lines listed by the Consultant. Congressman
Talcott, who had not expected changes, found the Mills line unac-
ceptable. When the consultant informed him of what was being
proposed by the Mills Committee, he wired that the proposal was
not in the best interests of his constituency. Later he wrote regard-
ing alternative suggestions: "The proposals get worse."
In the hectic two-hour Senate caucus on reapportionment, with
about thirty of the thirty-nine members attending, the disatisfaction
of Republicans became all too apparent.20 Charges flew that the
Congressional bill was a Burton bill. The mere name Burton was
anathema to many conservatives and to legislators in general.
When the chart of registration information was distributed, only
San Francisco lacked figures, because of an exception in the election
code, but the state senators wanted to know why Burton's district
did not have registration percentages.
The state senate scene was complicated by the death of State Sen-
ator Eugene McAteer, which left the voting balance twenty Demo-
crats to nineteen Republicans. The pending special election in San
Francisco would have to decide whether the state senate would re-
main in Democratic control, or be tied, with Republican Lieutenant-
Governor Robert Finch able to cast the deciding vote. Added to the
implications was the entrance into that race of Assemblyman John
Burton, brother of the Congressman.
20. San Francisco Chronicle, July 12, 1967.
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The dissatisfaction of Democrats also played a role. Congress-
man Harold T. Johnson, former state senator, objected to the re-
alignment in his district. His former colleague Hugh Burns, Presi-
dent pro tempore, and others echoed a desire to maintain the status
quo.
State Senator Burns came forth with his own resolution that
called for delay of reapportionment until after the next federal
census.
21
Burns quoted Congressman B. F. "Bernie" Sisk as saying that only
a few Congressmen wanted action. He claimed that his resolution
(Senate Resolution 83) had bipartisan support. The caucus went in
favor of the Burns resolution.22 The resolution sounded the call that
was to become virtually the sole reason for no action-the 1960 fig-
ures were inadequate. Added, of course, was the argument that the
courts were overstepping their jurisdiction.
The result of wires, letters, and other communications from Re-
publican Congressmen was a stalemate. Mills, who had tried to
incorporate most of the Congressional proposals in his bill found the
rug pulled out from under him. In a lengthy explanatory letter
written to the Congressmen, Mills concluded:
The action by the Republican Congressmen, that of encouraging
their State Senators to oppose Congressional Reapportionment on
philosophical grounds, has resulted in the Senate's declaring its
opposition to any such action. This has delivered the question
to the courts.2 3
Mills was especially annoyed that the challenge was put on philo-
sophical grounds that established a no-retreat position, in contrast
to mere objection that would allow the normal legislative maneuver-
ing.
To all intents and purposes the Mills bill was dead-as well as
the congressional package. In defiance of the obvious trend of
court decisions, the State Senate took the ostrich position. State
Senator Mills prophesied that the Courts would act and that the
21. S. Res. 83, 1967 Reg. Sess.
22. Sacramento Bee, July 12, 1967. Senator Mills had prepared an
alternative resolution that was not used in view of the caucus approval
of the Burns statement.
23. Letter from Senator Mills to all members of the California Congres-
sional Delegation, July 18, 1967. Mills declared, "I cannot say that I am
unhapply to be temporarily rid of it."
Legislature would be back for a special session. Apparently few of
his colleagues believed him. Others began to speculate that if the
Legislature did not act the court would pick up the Mills plan as its
own, or possibly develop its own plan that might not be any worse
than the current proposals. On the Assembly side, Fenton was still
mulling his data and delaying presentation of any bill. The Assem-
bly leadership was also banking on inaction, or taking the position
that, if the Court pressed for action, the Speaker and his followers
would be able to come to the rescue.
At the close of the legislative session, when the legislature was
clearly on record as doing nothing on Congressional redistricting, the
court wheels began to move. As expected, Phill Silver, a Los An-
geles attorney long active in California reapportionment matters,
filed a petition to activate his previous appeal of 1965.24 But also
before the court was another appeal by one Abe Vickter, Los Angeles
labor leader.25 The two petitions basically requested the same thing
-action!-but the Vickter approach varied by including a proposed
realignment of Congressional districts within a 1 percent variation,
with two exceptions (whole counties). If the court chose to act,
without a trained staff it would have difficulty developing a reap-
portionment plan, unless it called for at-large elections. Since time
was of the essence to get 1968 elections underway, the proposed
ideal plan could potentially be the court plan. As an indication of
what might happen if legislative action were not forthcoming, the
Vickter plan may have encouraged more concern by some individ-
uals. It is not without significance that when the state legislative
staff sought to check out by computer the implication of the Vickter
plan its programming code was HAVOC.
To the consternation of several Congressmen of both parties, the
Vickter plan had been drawn up by their former consultant. One
Republican Congressman wrote to the consultant inquiring whether
the Vickter plan had indeed been prepared by him, and he replied:
The sequence of events have fallen in this order. I assumed my
responsibilities with the Congressional delegation ended in July
when the State Senate rejected the so-called "package" primarily
on the basis of Republican objection which appeared in Sacramento
to be unanimous. I can assure you that it was the agreed plan that
I attempted to push in Sacramento, but apparently that was not
the view of some Congressmen.
Soon after I began my vacation from reapportionment (with
considerable relief) a lawyer (David Leveton) contacted me on
24. Sacramento Bee, August 18, 1967; Silver v. Reagan, 67 Cal. 2d 452;
62 Cal. Rptr. 424; 432 P.2d 26 (1967).
25. Vickter's appeal was consolidated with Silver v. Reagan, 67 Cal. 2d
452; 62 Cal. Rptr. 424; 432 P.2d 26 (1967).
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behalf of his client (Mr. Vickter, whom I do not know). He asked if
I could prepare a reapportionment plan without regard to incum-
bents or political factors, that would be within 1 percent variation,
be compact and break counties or communities as little as possible.
I said as a technician (my role in the previous process) I could.
It is that plan which appears in the brief.
Quite naturally coming down from 5 percent to 1 percent would
necessitate considerable change from previous plans, which were
not considered. With two exceptions every Congressman of both
parties will to varying degrees find a difference between the brief
plan and the previous plan. The exceptions are McFall and Waldie,
whose districts made up of whole counties did not have to be
altered. If this plan were adopted by the court I am sure almost
every Congressman would hate my guts, again to varying degree.
However, a court reapportionment was exactly what the "package"
deal sought to avoid. Unfortunately, for various reasons many
Congressmen of both parties did not support the legislative pro-
gram. If the court does not act then their gamble will pay off; if
not then someone is going to do it.26
On October 6, 1967, the State Supreme Court met to hear petitions.
The result called for legislative action by December 7th.2 7 If the
legislature did not act the court indicated that it would. It invited
interested parties to submit proposals with figures, grouping of
census tracts, or boundaries. Specifically it said:
We believe that all interested parties should be afforded an oppor-
tunity to be heard as to what plan the court should adopt if the
Legislature fails to adopt a valid plan. Since time is of the es-
sence, any proposed plan should be presented to the court not later
than November 10, 1967. Any such plan must include illustrative
maps and the population of the proposed districts based on the
1960 census and set forth complete descriptions of the districts either
by metes and bounds or by reference to whole counties, whole
present or former assembly districts, or other whole political sub-
divisions or census tracts. Any plan submitted should be accom-
panied by a brief setting forth why the plan should be adopted.
All proposed plans may be filed on or before November 27, 1967.
In the event that the Legislature has not enacted a valid congres-
sional reapportionment measure by December 7, 1967, the court will
order into effect a plan it deems appropriate.28
Though rejecting the legislative desire (both on the state and na-
tional levels) for no action, the court indicated a willingness to ac-
cept moderate changes, up to potentially 15 percent, in view of the
rapid changes in population. It allowed that some effort might be
26. Personal correspondence.
27. Long Beach Press Telegram, October 6, 1967.
28. Silver v. Reagan, 67 Cal. 2d 452, 458; 62 Cal. Rptr. 424, 428; 432 P.2d
26,30 (1967).
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made to recognize population change within the 15 percent lati-
tude.29 Almost immediately the Governor indicated that he would
call a special session to handle the matter. Although Governor
Reagan deemed the court action ill timed and ill founded, he stated
that the legislature should handle the matter. The call to begin a
special session November 7th was made.80
In the interim, the reluctant participants come to life again.
Assemblyman Fenton and his group arrived in Washington on Octo-
ber 24th for renewed discussions but without a concrete program.
State Senator Mills and his group arrived in Washington on October
30th. The Republican state senate victory in San Francisco and
other political developments put the senate visit in a different per-
spective from the earlier visit of June. With the state senate tied,
the potential for Republican control seemed realistic if all Republi-
can State Senators supported one candidate for the President pro
tempore position, with Republican Lieutenant-Governor Finch cast-
ing the deciding vote. Republican minority leader McCarthy was
seeking to assert a Republican position to boost his chances against
determined challenges to his leadership. Senator Mills hoped to
salvage his proposals by gaining near-unanimous Congressional ap-
proval for what was in essence their proposals.
Democrats met with Democratic State Senators and Republicans
met with the Republican State Senators, individually and collec-
tively. Then on October 31st the entire California Congressional
delegation met with the State Senators. As the delegation was
getting down to final action the surprise of the day came with the
presentation of an alternate Republican proposal by Assemblyman
Charles Conrad, an expert on reapportionment from his days as
co-architect of the 1951 Republican reapportionment. His plan was
called the "minimum change" proposal. The effect was to create
serious problems for Democratic Congressmen Corman and Tunney,
as well as other subtle manipulations for party advantage. The
Conrad proposal was given an airing but attracted little support.
All Congressmen were invited to indicate their dissatisfaction with
the altered Mills proposals. Congressman Gubser presented a
summary of a carefully reasoned statement that he had previously
distributed. Although several other dissents were expressed, pos-
sibly for home consumption, the general tone was "let's get it over
with." Though points of dissatisfaction with the Mills proposal
29. Sacramento Bee, October 7, 1967; Los Angeles Times, October 7,
1967.
30. Long Beach Press-Telegram, October 10, 1967; Los Angeles Times,
October 10, 1967.
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were strongly felt, most Congressmen believed it to be "probably
the best we can hope for."
As the special session got underway in Sacramento an article in
the Wall Street Journal created considerable furor. Entitled Mas-
sive Gerrymander Mapped in California by 38 Congressmen, Joseph
W. Sullivan's article implied that California incumbents were re-
sorting to the worst of political deeds in what "may be the greatest
bipartisan gerrymander in U.S. history."31 The facts recited were
correct but quite obviously a good part of the article had been
deleted in the newspaper office. The broad generalizations that
remained and that constituted evaluations left much to be desired.
The result was a brutal attack on the delegation.
The response was immediate. Democratic Congressman John
McFall described the story as "unfair, unreasonable and untrue."
He went on to say:
There was nothing secret about it. As a result of these meetings
some changes were made. Now, there's general support in the
delegation.
I suppose you can say we conspired not to hurt each other, if
friends can conspire to do that.32
Republican Congressman H. Allen Smith remarked:
We haven't drawn up any lines. We've drawn lines among our-
selves in our minds but not on paper. I haven't seen a map, but it's
my understanding the Mills bill is pretty much in accordance with
what we all discussed.33
The consultant said that the plan was:
[D]esirable from the point of view of seniority the state could
gain. Most incumbents will be protected, and the State will gain
from their seniority. Anyone who recognizes the way Washington
operates knows seniority is an important factor.34
State Senator John McCarthy, Republican minority leader said:
"I refuse to accept such an accusation." 35
If the Wall Street Journal article was indicative of typical press
coverage one would have cause for reflection on a politician's
adverse remarks about the press. For example, the Wall Street
31. Wall Street Journal, November 9, 1967.
32. Los Angeles Times, November 10, 1967.
33. Id.
34. Long Beach Press-Telegram, November 10, 1967.
35. Id.
Journal quoted the consultant as saying: "They were a bunch of
wallflowers at first, but once we got them dancing it was hard to
get some of them to stop."36 What the consultant had said was,
"most members had at first been reluctant to get involved in the
reapportionment. The vast majority of Congressmen would just
as soon have waited until 1972. However, once the writing was on
the wall, they acted, and the results were sometimes startling."
Although unfortunate in respect to the damage to the legislative
image, the article did contribute political benefit for those interested
in getting the Congressional bill passed. Several Congressmen who
otherwise might have failed to comment were forced to make
statements (if qualified statements) on its behalf. Furthermore,
the logic of the action and procedure was aired. Especially the
point was brought out that the action was an interim measure and
that the probable re-election of incumbents would increase their
seniority in the House of Representatives, a factor that would be
of utmost benefit to the state.
When the Legislature met on November 6, 1967, four proposals
emerged: the Mills Bill (S.B.1), McCarthy Bill (S.B.2), Fenton
Bill (A.B.3), and Conrad Bill (A.B.2).
The Conrad bill became the Republican bill. Its effect has been
previously mentioned.37 Known as a "minimum change" bill, its
subtle Republicanism was a rallying point for internal political
struggle over Republican Assembly leadership. The McCarthy
Bill made drastic alterations to enhance Republican opportunities
in the 7th C.D. by dropping its Democratic registration from 58.8
to 53.7 percent and in the 17th C.D. by a more drastic Democratic
drop from 64.3 to 52.3 percent.38 Other changes would have been
to the advantage of the Republicans, possibly more so than the
Conrad Bill. However, it was a last-minute effort and unrealistic
from several viewpoints. Two examples of the unpolitical nature
of the McCarthy program may be noted. Without direct geo-
graphical proximity Manin County was linked with the 7th C.D.
the home district of Senator Sherman, Vice Chairman of the
Senate Elections and Reapportionment Committee. Although with
Republican advantages, it could not have been popular with the
Vice Chairman. The alteration in the 17th C.D. would probably
have ended the political career of Congressman Cecil King, the
Dean of the California Congressional delegation.
36. Wall Street Journal, November 9, 1967.
37. See discussion at page 22, supra.
38. Long Beach Press-Telegram, November 10, 1967; Sacramento Bee,
November 10, 1967.
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In the case of both the Conrad and McCarthy bills, the efforts
were not only reapportionment exercises but also represented the
important internal political struggle for Republican leadership in
the respective houses.3 9 McCarthy was attempting to salvage his
waning leadership in the Senate and to boost his image for a tough
1968 election battle. Conrad's program represented a challenge
to liberal Republican leadership in the Assembly.
Actually only the first two bills (Fenton and Mills) received
serious consideration. With the Republican Congressmen in general
agreement in support of the Congressional program, it was virtually
impossible to mobilize the Republican minority in the state legis-
lature for an all out fight that would have depended on wooing
supporters from the Democratic majority. Party leaders outside
the legislature and their advisors tried, but without success. Their
efforts were termed "unrealistic."
The Fenton Bill, in effect, was a "hi-jacked" Mills Bill, with some
modification similar to the Vickter proposal. It was proclaimed as
a more Democratic bill. In effect it made enough changes to appear
different from the earlier proposals that were worked out by others.
Besides, it incorporated desires of individual Congressmen closely
aligned with Speaker Unruh while creating sufficient disadvantages
for others to require appeals and to make them respectful of power.
The Mills Bill had made minor modifications to placate some
Congressional dissatisfaction, notably alterations in the Santa Clara
area.
Both Fenton and Mills conducted public hearings with minor
responses. Fenton's committee held three hearings in Los Angeles
(October 16, 17 and 18) and others in San Bernardino (October 19),
San Diego (October 23), Fresno (October 26), Sacramento (Oc-
tober 27), and in San Francisco (October 30 and 31). Mills' com-
mittee held hearings in Los Angeles on October 27 and in San
Francisco November 3.40 There is no indication that public opinion
reshaped the bills in either case.
On November 13, 1967, the Fenton Bill cleared the Assembly by a
vote of 42 to 25.41 Virtually all the legislators acknowledged that
39. Sacramento Bee, November 24, 1967.
40. Sacramento Bee, October 10, 1967; Los Angeles Times, October 11,
1967.
41. Assembly J., S. Sess., November 13, 1967, 45; Los Angeles Times, No-
vember 14, 1967.
the details would be worked out in a conference committee. On
the floor the bill was termed a "monstrosity" by Assemblyman
Conrad whose bill had been rejected in committee. Other com-
ments focused on the court. Assemblyman Conrad said: "The
problem we face is the fault of the Court-a Court that has been
arrogant and incompetent."4 2
Fenton defended his bill as "a good, workable plan." He added
"under the circumstances it is the best we can find.143 Nine Re-
publicans and thirty-three Democrats supported the measure while
twenty-two Republicans and three Democrats opposed it.
On the following day the Senate Elections and Reapportionment
Committee took up its own Senate bills along with the Fenton
Bill. The Conrad plan was revived by Senator Bradley, who in-
troduced it as Senate Bill 5. The committee chose to amend the
Fenton Bill by inserting the language of the Mills Bill. In turn the
Senate approved it by a 22 to 15 vote on November 15. Six Re-
publicans and sixteen Democrats supported the measure while
fourteen Republicans and one Democrat opposed it.44 The Assembly
cleared the way for a joint conference by rejecting the amended
Senate proposal on November 16.45
The conference committee consisted of Assemblyman Leon Ralph
(D-Los Angeles), Frank Murphy (R-Santa Cruz), and Jack Fenton
(D-Montebello), and State Senators James R. Mills (D-San Diego),
Lewis F. Sherman (R-Berkeley), and John F. McCarthy (R-San
Rafael). Some thirty-four specific discrepancies existed, and the
four key problem areas centered around the realignment of the
2nd C.D., the division of Sacramento County between the 3rd and
4th C.D.s, the Long Beach-Orange County tie-ups involving the
32nd C.D., and the 34th C.D., and the 25th C.D. that also concerned
linking Orange County with Los Angeles County.4"
After a conference of several hours, with emotional and ego
exchanges, the issues were resolved and the technicalities were
left to the staff members. On November 19, the Congressional con-
sultant joined staff members of both houses in an attempt to iron
out discrepancies and improve descriptions. Though the Con-
gressional consultant and state senate consultant were doubtful of
some arrangements, the assumptions seemed to be that the package
would move rapidly through the legislature by Thanksgiving.
42. Los Angeles Times, November 14, 1967.
43. Id.
44. Senate J., S. Sess., November 15, 1967, 131-132; Los Angeles Times.
November 16, 1967.
45. Assembly J., S. Sess., November 16, 1967, at 225.
46. Sacramento Bee, November 17, 1967.
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Those expectations were dashed on November 21. The Assembly
leadership was faced with a solid Republican bloc that refused to
move the Fenton Bill, 47 with its 52 amendments, the product of the
conference committee. The conference committee had approved the
report by a 4-to-2 vote, with McCarthy and Murphy dissenting.48
Outwardly, the controversy hinged on challenges to the Fenton staff
figures. Getting population figures to balance is always difficult,
but with inexperience, ego, ignorance and a computer approach
compounding the normal proclivities to err, the problem becomes
impossible. Add to that a politician's bid for points, revenge,
prestige, and headlines, and every triviality becomes an issue.
Again Assemblyman Conrad led the attack. Ten districts were
said to be beyond the 5 percent figure claimed by Fenton. 49 Again
at the staff level (including the State Senate, Assembly, Congres-
sional, and Conrad staffs) the details were analyzed and reanalyzed
endlessly. Actually the congressional reapportionment had become
involved in issues beyond representation. The participants were
arguing statistical trivia, wheeling and dealing without facts,
treating census tracts as children might play with blocks, damning
the courts, and deploring the use of 1960 figures, but the essence
involved the internal Republican power struggle in the Assembly
and intraparty issues of medical cuts, income tax deductions, and
judicial appointments for the Speaker. Judging from the press
coverage, no one seemed greatly concerned about the great issues
of representation, representative government, democracy, Baker v.
Carr, etc. The participants were involved in the thicket of reap-
portionment with the drakes and ganders.
After the preliminaries and the statements for party and home
consumption, the Legislature moved toward "getting it over with."
The court deadline was just around the corner. The court had been
reviewing several plans as a result of its October invitation. If the
Legislature did not act, the court would, and it had the means. In
general the participants reacted: "Let's get it over-whatever it
might be."
The previous bills had been scrapped in favor of a new Fenton
Bill (A.B.9) that embodied the conference committee work, in-
47. Long Beach Press-Telegram, November 22, 1967; Sacramento Bee,
November 24, 1967.
48. Los Angeles Times, November 18, 1967.
49. Long Beach Press Telegram, November 22, 1967.
cluding balancing all the district figures. On November 30, the
Assembly went on record as approving Assembly Bill 9.
On December 5th, the Senate acted, by a vote of 21 to 15, making
minor amendments that had been agreed upon. Six Republicans
and fifteen Democrats supported the plan. Fourteen Republicans
and one Democrat opposed it. On the same day the Assembly
concurred in the amendments and approved the measure.60 Nine
Republicans joined thirty-three Democrats in support, while twenty-
eight Republicans and seven Democrats opposed the measure. On
December 6, Lieutenant Governor Robert Finch, as Acting Gover-
nor, signed the Fenton Bill. As he did so, he said, "Gentlemen, the
deed is done." 5 1 Probably thirty-eight Congressmen silently said
their "Amens."
CoMnMTAR
Close association with legislators, especially after the 1967 re-
apportionment, has not diminished the writer's respect and ad-
miration for them. Indeed, it has increased it. The legislator's
task is difficult and often thankless. My purpose is to describe
the reapportionment process in operation-one of the most political
of matters-in order to clarify the nature of that process.
What Was Done: A careful analysis of the reapportionment bills
will indicate that incumbent interests played a major role in the
creation of the 1967 program. Not only can that be substantiated by
the 1965 proposals, but the modifications made necessary by the
1966 election confirm it. In this regard the practices are not un-
usual.
When all the alternative plans are considered, it will be seen
that every Congressional district might have been changed sub-
stantially. In the final bill only one district (the 14th) escaped
alteration. All other districts were changed to varying degrees.
The major changes occurred in seven areas that will be discussed
separately. In the north the realignment of the underpopulated
4th C.D. centered around movement into the overpopulated 3rd
C.D. The big question was how best to divide Sacramento County.
Congressman John E. Moss wanted to keep the city of Sacramento
intact and the northwest corner of the county compact. At the
same time Congressman Robert L. Leggett, representing several
small counties, did not want so much of Sacramento County that
he would become a "Sacramento Congressman" at the expense of
50. Assembly J., S. Sess., December 5, 1967, at 225; Senate J., S. Sess.,
December 5, 1967, at 226.
51. Laguna Beach Daily Pilot, December 6, 1967.
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his other counties. Difficulties also centered around which portions
of the county should go to Leggett. Special attention had to be
given the issue of growing suburban areas whose 1960 census figures
did not reflect the population and/or party registration. Finally,
Leggett was given 80,000 people from Sacramento County, moving
Lake County into the Ist C.D., while Moss retained the city of Sacra-
mento nucleus but not the northwest corner of the county. Thus
Leggett's constituency belonged in two portions of the county and
in area covered most of Sacramento County.
In San Francisco the underpopulated 5th C.D. of Democratic
Congressman Phillip Burton was extended into the 6th C.D. of
Republican Congressman William S. Maihlard. In turn the 6th
C.D. had to cover additional population. Two logicial alternatives
were available: Marin County that was part of the overpopulated
1st C.D., or San Mateo County that as a unit was the overpopulated
11th C.D. In view of Maillard's substantial Democratic registration,
a move into San Mateo would have been a move into a Republican
area and would have weakened the Republican 11th C.D. Burton's
Democratic 5th C.D. could have been moved into San Mateo but
adjacent areas were Democratic, and that would have weakened
the Democratic chances in San Mateo County.52 Considering politi-
cal realities and the overpopulation of the 1st C.D., the preference
of the Marin-San Francisco combination was obvious to all except
the people of Marin and their legislators. The next question was:
How far into Marin County should the division cut? The solution
was known as the Burton-Bagley line, though both Burton and
Bagley objected. Assimblyman William T. Bagley's interest stem-
med from a potential future Congressional bid. Eventually ap-
proximately 100,000 of Marin County's population was added to the
6th C.D. In turn the 1st C.D. of Congressman Don H. Clausen was
depleted of surplus population, even with the acquisition of Lake
County from the 4th C.D.
The solution in the 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th C.D.s has already been
referred to in relationship to the ripple effect.53 The Democratic
52. It is not without significance that the Fenton-Unruh proposal created
a narrow corridor to give Burton certain Republican sections in San Mateo
County with the dual advantage of potentially creating a problem for
Burton and also boosting Democratic percentage in the 11th C.D.
53. See text at - supra.
7th C.D. had to reach into the Democratic 8th C.D., with the issue
centering around how many Negroes Congressman Jeffrey Cohelan
would acquire, the implication being that eventually the Congres-
sional district would be substantially Negro. The 8th C.D. of Con-
gressman George P. Miller was pushed into the 9th C.D. in a fashion
not especially pleasing to the Hayward-Newark political leaders.
In the planning stage, the Democratic 9th C.D. of Congressman Don
Edwards was expanded into the Democratic section of the Re-
publican 10th C.D. of Congressman Charles S. Gubser, although
the overpopulation of districts in the San Joaquin Valley would
have seemed an alternative if mountain barriers and socio-economic
differences between the two constituencies had not discouraged
that move. The final Fenton proposal brought the 9th C.D. into
the Democratic sections of southern San Mateo County, as well as
portions of the 10th C.D. The l1th C.D. of the late Republican
Congressman J. Arthur Younger now contained a higher percentage
of Republican voters. The depleted 10th C.D. previously over-
populated, had to be expanded into San Benito County. Removal
of the latter from the 12th C.D. lessened the Republican following
of Congressman Burt L. Talcott and required his jumping the
mountain barrier into the San Joaquin Valley with a narrow
county- boundary connection to Kings County.
Though neither of the moves of the 10th and 12th C.D.s jeopar-
dized the Republican incumbents, they vigorously dissented, and not
without reason. Gubser pointed out that his district's overpopula-
tion for a decade seemed to warrant some consideration, especially
in a proposal that depleted his district to the point of requiring its
expansion. Why couldn't surplus population from his district
just be trimmed away without further changes? Added to that
was the population growth of Santa Clara County that by 1971
would require the dropping of San Benito County from the 10th
C.D. just as it had been dropped in 1961. Thus San Benito County
in the many reapportionments of the 1960s would have been shifted
three times, only to be shifted again in 1971.
Talcott argued that it was desirable to retain his district's com-
munity unity that was indicated by the preponderance of Spanish
city names and agricultural interests. The Congressman also
pointed to the near ideal population and the extended nature of
his district. Like many of their peers, Congressman Gubser and
Talcott were caught in the ripple that began with realignment of
districts to the north. When adjustments were made elsewhere,
their results required changes in other districts, just as a stone pro-
duces ripples in other parts of the pool far removed from the
initial point of contact between the stone and the water. They may
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well have said: "Is this exactitude the goal professors and lawyers
fought for in reapportionment cases?" Their plea, "Why not start
the ripple from our base?" is typical of the perspective of politi-
cians and laymen, as well as of many scholars.
In Southern California the significant shifts involved primarily
the districts of freshman Republicans and adjacent Democratic
districts that Democrats boost in favorable registration. In Re-
publican Jerry L. Pettis' San Bernardino County district (the 33rd)
the benfit of surplus population was given to Democrat John V.
Tunney of the 38th C.D., while Congressman Glenard P. Lipscomb
picked up about 20,000 constituents in the western part of San
Bernardino County. These exchanges highlight the differences
between the 1965 and 1967 plans. In 1965 the Democrat from the
33rd exchanged heavy Republican sections to Lipscomb, and Tunney
was not involved. In 1967 the reverse took place because of changes
resulting from the 1966 election. San Bernardino Democrats were
very hostile to the arrangement but were unsuccessful in block-
ing it.
The position of Republican Congressman Charles E. Wiggins of
the 25th C.D. reflected another change in perspective from 1965 to
1967. In 1965 the Democratic 25th C.D. was not altered, but when a
Republican was elected in that district in 1966, the desirability of
strengthening the district was obvious from a Republican view-
point. The underpopulated 25th C.D. was therefore moved into
the northern Orange County Republican sections of the overpopu-
lated 34th and 35th C.D.s. The effect was to relieve some pressure
from Democratic Congressman Richard T. Hanna. Wiggins' Demo-
cratic registration percentage dropped from 62 to 50. Furthermore,
Hanna's district was also aided by the exchange of territory with
Republican Congressman Craig Hosmer of the 32nd C.D. A small
portion of the 34th C.D. was given to the 35th C.D. of Congressman
James B. Utt. In the latter case the area was growing substantially
and being populated by more Republicans that Democrats.
Another major shift that differed from the 1965 proposals was in
relationship to the 28th C.D. of Republican Congressman Alphonzo
Bell. The elongated 28th C.D. has long been the butt of jokes
about gerrymandering. The district, a strip along the coast of the
Santa Monica Bay, goes into the Hollywood Hills, then extends into
the Palos Verdes peninsula by way of a narrow corridor in the
Playa del Rey Marina area. This has led to the remark that at
high tide portions of the district are not contiguous. Actually, the
existence of several independent cities along the coast and their
common interests make the district logical. At the same time,
Republican voting strength is concentrated.
In 1965 the corridor to Palos Verdes was eliminated by the exten-
sion of the Democratic 26th, 31st and 17th C.D.s into the 28th
C.D. But in 1967 at least two of the Democratic incumbents were
adamantly against such a change, in view of the 1966 elections.
The McCarthy bill would have proceeded according to the 1965
intent, but the final bill retained the coastal district and whittled
the surplus constituency from the Hollywood Hills. A sizeable
section of the 28th C.D. in that area was absorbed by Congressman
Thomas M. Rees.
The exchanges between Bell and Rees constituted a fascinating
but frustrating aspect of the reapportionment process. Although
the overpopulation of one district and the underpopulation of the
other might seem to suggest an easy solution, esecially in view of
Democratic areas that Rees could have absorbed, both men wanted
the same areas. At one point the difference narrowed to a question
of shifting 20,000 more people that Rees wanted to draw from one
area and Bell wanted to draw from another. The consultant sug-
gested 10,000 from each area, and a temporary agreement was
reached. The final bill gave Rees much of what he wanted, while
Bell's plans were upset by state legislative politics. Rees obtained
sections in the Hollywood Hills, the rest of Hollywood Strip and
additional territory in West Los Angeles. Most of the area was
part of Los Angeles City. Bell, on the other hand, lost much of the
population of the City of Los Angeles to Rees and Reinecke, while
retaining the Palos Verdes peninsula area that he wished to give
up. It was rumored that both men aspired to run for Mayor of
Los Angeles and that each wanted to hold as much as possible of
the City of Los Angeles in his congressional district. At any rate,
Rees got the better of the bargain.
Republican Congressman Ed Reinecke of the 27th C.D. was
awarded additional sections of the 28th C.D. that Congressman
Bell had wanted. This extension was in the form of a claw. To
the west Reinecke took from Democrat James C. Corman signifi-
cant sections almost surrounding the 22nd C.D. Corman took
Democratic sections from Reinecke. Reinecke's percentage dropped
from 60 percent Democratic to approximately 50. In the process
Corman's district became more Democratic, but still marginal.
The resulting 27th district may well succeed the 28th C.D. as a
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classical modern image of the gerrymander. The district extends
into Kern County for some 75 miles, and it links northern Los
Angeles sections with the west San Fernando Valley despite the
absence of a direct thoroughfare. The east portion of Kern County
is similar to northern Los Angeles economically and geographically.
Highway 395 (the only highway through that part of the desert)
links the area more to Los Angeles County than to Kern County,
and the mountains between east and west Kern County create
further separation. Indeed, boundary lines of Kern County merely
reflect the inadequacy of nineteenth-century line drawing. Further-
more, the overall population distribution in the state and the
gographical barriers make the connection logical. Still, the shape
of the district invites the cry of gerrymander.
The argument that the lack of a thoroughfare mitigated against
the creation of this district was not reasonable. In a metropolitan
area, districts are not expected to have an internal transportation
network. Almost all Congressmen in the Los Angeles area cross into
other districts as they travel (if they do) in their districts. Only
if one regarded each district as a province would the argument
have validity. Congressman Reinecke's own comments in response
to the Wall Street Journal that gave him the "prize" for the gerry-
mander of the year gives insight into the creation of a district:
"I am not happy with my new district. It extends into areas I
don't want. But I'll accept it. I wouldn't say it's unfair. I would
say the newspaper article is totally unfair."54
In the other Congressional districts the changes were moderate to
minor. Madera County and 40,000 people were added to the 2nd
C.D. of Democrat Harold T. Johnson from Democratic B. F. "Bernie"
Sisk's heavily populated 16th C.D. Congressman Sisk resisted
further change because he wanted to keep Merced and Fresno
counties intact. However, additional population was needed for
Democrat John McFall's 15th C.D. and this was arranged in the
final version of the bill by the division of Merced County. The
18th C.D. was depleted of its surplus population by the previously
described alteration in the 28th C.D. and the 12th C.D. Most
notable was the removal from the 18th C.D. of Kings County, the
home of former Congressman Hagan, who had been defeated by
Republican Robert Mathias in 1966.
54. Sacramento Bee, November 10, 1967.
The 13th C.D. of Republican Charles Teague picked up additional
population from Los Angeles. Los Angeles Congressmen Charles
Wilson (D), August Hawkins (D), Cecil King (D), Del Clawson
(R), Edward Roybal (D), Chet Holifield (D), George Brown, Jr.
(D), H. Allen Smith (R), and Glenard Lipscomb (R) had minor
adjustments made to their districts without drastic effect. Gener-
ally there was a slight addition or loss in registration. Probably the
most notable exchange of territory involved Negroes, when Negro
Democratic Congressman Hawkins absorbed Negro sections from
Wilson, Roybal and Clawson. Republican Congressman Utt, whose
35th C.D. was overpopulated, had to relinquish territory in Orange
and San Diego Counties. San Diego Congressmen Lionel Van
Deerlin(D) and "Bob" Wilson (R) absorbed some Utt territory
while making minor internal shifts between their districts.
Aside from accomplishing some judicious change of territory to
the benefit of most incumbents, the important feature was the
breaking of county lines. The legal requirements have previously
been mentioned as obstacles to the formation of equitable districts.5 5
The 1967 demand for "one man, one vote", with slight variations,
required the ignoring of county lines. Needless to say, every break
caused righteous indignation from county groups and laments
from county registrars. New flexibility in manipulation of dis-
tricts had occurred in 1965 realignments of Assembly and State
senatorial districts, and in 1967 advantage was taken of this prec-
edent for the shaping of Congressional districts. The results were
two-fold. In the first place, the disregard for county lines not
only presented the opportunity for the creation of more equitable
districts but it also permitted more gerrymandering. Although
that aspect may be deplored, another result occurred that may be
more positive. The unrealistic county lines of the nineteenth
century were disregarded again. The Congressional districts in
many cases became true metropolitan areas, eliminating the paro-
chialism inherent in districts following county lines. The new
districts have the potential to become instrumentalities of the
twenty-first century if Congressmen respond to their broader
responsibility and if the electorate recognizes their common prob-
lems that make county lines superfluous.
What Might Have Been Done: To analyze the potential political
alternatives would be a fruitless exercise after the deed. On the
other hand, to write in general terms at this time may have some
value for the future.
First, one could argue that the 1967 realignment ought to have
55. See text at (2) and (5) supra.
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been developed with 1971 in mind. Such a course was often recom-
mended by the consultant to individual Congressmen. However,
such a realignment would have required shifts for virtually every-
one, and the use of estimates would have inspired arguments to
say the least. From what today seems to be a 1971 perspective,
the elimination of the 23rd C.D. (Democratic, held by a Republican)
would have eased problems for Los Angeles Democrats and boosted
their constituencies to require little adjustment in 1971. In turn,
Republican Clawson might have found a better permanent base
in an entirely new district.
On the other side of the political coin one might argue that more
marginal districts ought to have been created, but the Democratic
landslide in 1964 and the Republican landslide in 1966 must naturally
have caused doubts. When a party has confidence in future success,
marginal districts have appeal, but under other circumstances
such districts are double-edged swords. Despite the principle of
representative government, the political situation and the tempo-
rary nature of the redistricting both mitigated against the alterna-
tives.
Factors in the Reapportionmenit: Many articles in periodicals
have discussed the factors that should enter into the creation of a
representative system.56 Some of them, as well as court opinions,
have alluded to the political factors that play a role in the reap-
portionment process. Without pretending to give an exhaustive
analysis (such as will be found in other articles), an attempt will
be made to point out some realities.
It is generally understood that population, geography, legal re-
quirements, and socio-economic interests should be considered.
To varying degrees each of these factors was weighed; neverthe-
less, for each of them a violation could probably be cited. Each
proponent used a factor to support his case, or unearthed a prior
factor that deserved more consideration. Each opponent could do
the same. This reveals that if a priority of factors is not agreed
56. Two interesting early discussions of the factors of reapportionment
appear in the Report of the Assembly-Interim Committee on Elections
and Reapportionment 1951 and The Report of the Assembly Interim Com-
mittee on Elections and Reapportionment 1961. The reports are contrasted
in L. Hardy, The Theory and Practice of Reapportionment (mimeographed
paper delivered at the American Political Science Association, September
1960, New York City, New York).
upon in advance, the reapportioners can jump from one factor to
another with immunity.57 Among the conflicting opinions the
promoter is always one jump ahead.
The evolution of several plans that varied from 1 percent to 15
percent plus others built around the earliest ones has provided a
unique opportunity to see the less obvious political factors in
operation. The shifts made generally gave Democratic incumbents
an increase of Democratic constituents from Republican districts,
and vice versa.
Not all the other factors at work are obvious. One special aim of
an incumbent was to retain or gain large factories within his district.
Because of this the pressure to unify a city might stop at a factory
gate. In one case a large facility was divided between districts so
as to encourage dual campaign contributions. Of equal interest
to other Congressmen was inclusion in their districts of military
installations, especially if they were on armed service committees
or other committees dealing with the military.
While a California state legislator is legally required to reside
in his district, Congressmen were less concerned with inclusion of
their homes in their districts. Just the same, an effort was made
to include the incumbent's home in his district, but if the choice was
between the home or a good district, the latter had priority. It
seemed important to Congressmen to make sure that their ex-
panded districts did not force the shifting of the main electoral base
of an old district. This concern regarding the 4th C.D. has already
been cited. Similar problems would have existed ff the 9th C.D.
had extended over mountains into the San Joaquin Valley; if
more of Orange County had been included in the 25th C.D.; if more
of Orange County had been included in the 32nd C.D.; or if the
26th C.D. had crossed the Hollywood Hills into the San Fernando
Valley.
At the same time that expansion was taking place, it was possible
to reshape a district in anticipation of 1971. Few Congressmen
demonstrated such foresight or even concern, but some were aware
that, if they should be firmly established in certain areas the 1971
reapportioners would be less likely to disturb the situation. More-
over, underpopulated Democratic districts could have been ex-
panded to the maximum variation, not only establishing a broader
base but also allowing an incumbent to solidify his support in
marginal areas before 1971. Again few Congressmen chose that
57. L. Hardy, The Theory and Practice of Reapportionment, (Mimeo-
graphed paper delivered at the American Political Science Association,
September, 1960, New York City, New York).
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alternative, preferring a minimum change. When the consultant
justified a move in those terms one older Congressman cheerfully
called him an optimist.
Several Democrats were anxious about racial or ethnic balances
within their districts, because it is generally thought that a 35%
Negro population might create a primary fight for an incumbent.
Some Congressmen sought additional "red-neck" (lower income
white with former Southern Democratic ties) territory to balance
Negro concentrations. Other Congressmen desired ethnic areas
favorably disposed to Democrats, or they relished the balancing
of Mexican-American, Jewish, or Italians against other groups.
Republicans were seemingly not plagued by the ethnic and racial
balances, a point that probably reflects that party's composition.
Sometimes the loyalty factor appeared and was especially cru-
cial to some Democrats. Party loyalty is defined in a variety of
ways, but basically it means the extent to which voting behavior
measures up to the registration figures. One could expand into a
Democratic area without accomplishing the purpose of a better
registration, if the Democrats failed to vote Democratic. One
Congressman was delighted with a shift made between him and
a fellow Democrat, because he had unloaded "bad" Democrats
(nonvoting, or Democrats who voted Republican) in exchange for
"good" Democrats. His registration percentage dropped, but he
anticipated a heavier vote.
One surprising dispute over realignment occurred between a
Democrat and a Republican over a territory that had a general
Republican persuasion. It happened to be a money area in which
the few wealthy Democrats among the Republicans contributed
substantially to party causes. The Republicans there were also
known to give generously to their party.
Almost everyone paid lip service to the idea of community, but
what constitutes community? Differences of opinion allowed wide
variations of interpretation and adjustments. The inclusion of a
whole city could justify a change in boundaries, while the splitting
of a city might mitigate against a proposed alteration. Frequently
the wandering city boundaries invited splitting, and the political
interests could always rationalize that the breaking of city lines
was a wise action.
Finally the reluctance of the politicians to say "good-by" should
be noted. Often the Congressman would agree to changes in
principle, but when he had to name the area he would relinquish
the choice was difficult. At times a Congressman hesitated to
make a statement about the area he wished to dispose of, for fear
he might retain the area and have his willingness to give it up
used against him in the next campaign: "He didn't want us, so we
don't want him." A surprising number of solutions were rejected
on the grounds that someone special lived in the area (mother,
campaign manager, a fat cat, college friend, great worker). The
reverse was the case when some ardent worker was more trouble
than she was worth: "Draw her out of the district!" This more
normally occurred where a potential opponent or former opponent
resided. Some Congressmen also claimed "They love me there,"
often an interpretation from the last election results. When a
politician says "They love me," the consultant recalls a 1961 ex-
perience when he tried unsuccessfully to persuade an incumbent
to change his district. They loved him so much that they ousted
him in the next primary.
What the Shifts Accomplished: Only time will tell whether the
political cartography has paid off for the participants. The previous
records of California reapportionment indicate that a party can-
not cement itself solidly enough to prevent change. On the other
hand, judicious reapportionment can aid a party by means of its
incumbents' interests. The Congressional picture since 1961 is
one of safety, with only minor shifts from one party to another.
Considering that the state has undergone two opposite landslides
in a brief period, the stability of opinion in the Congressional dis-
tricts is remarkable. Such results are to be attributed to redistrict-
ing practices. For example, in 1964, in state after state, the Demo-
crats picked up additional seats in the landslide, but this was not
true in California because in 1961 the Republican strength had been
concentrated. There were few Republican marginal districts.
With the tendency to increase the registration advantages of in-
cumbents by the redistricting of 1967, the trend can be expected to
continue. The major modification was the allowance for Republican
advantages as a result of the 1966 elections. Three normally Demo-
cratic districts (the 6th, 27th, and 25th) became heavily Republican
in voting behavior. Others were modified to Republican advantage
(33rd, 23rd, 18th) but not beyond the range of Democratic victory.
These changes, in turn, improved Democratic advantages in mar-
ginal districts, significantly in the 22nd and to lesser degree in the
34th and 38th. Other districts might show democratic increases
(e.g., the 1st and the 12th) but with little potential for Demo-
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cratic victory. Similarly, some Democratic districts dropped in
registration (the 31st, the 30th, the 17th, and the 26th) without
significant Republican advantages.
Though safety is the pattern and the trend, the electoral record
since 1960 is significant. In the 1964 Democratic landslide, Repub-
licans Clawson and Reinecke won Democratic districts (60 percent
plus). In 1966, Democrats Hanna, Corman, and Tunney won mar-
ginal districts in the face of a Republican onslaught while districts
with heavy Democratic registrations (the 18th and 25th) fell to
the Republicans. Those examples, plus a long past record, suggest
that factors other than registration figures may be important. In
particular, the personal factor is crucial, along with the ability to
keep the district happy and to continue to work the area.
The writer is inclined to believe that 15 of the 38 districts are
still marginal, considering the incumbent of each and his political
operations. If that estimate be accurate, it would compare favor-
ably with reapportionment practices in Britain and other nations.
Everything else being equal, the incumbents in 1967 may have done
themselves a favor, but the outcome is far from certain.
Another aspect of Congressional redistricting worth mentioning
is that it seems more permanent than state legislative realignment.
Though the Republicans lost control of the state legislature in the
1950s, their Congressional advantage was retained. Likewise, the
Democratic fortunes in the State Legislature have declined while
the Congressional advantage has been maintained. One explana-
tion may be that Congressional redistricting is at least one step
removed from the state legislative arena.
State legislators create electoral districts-their own and Con-
gressional districts. In the former, each participant is vitally con-
cerned with his district. The reapportionment struggle breaks
down into the Establishment vs. the outsiders. That may be a
party division, a rural-urban, or pressure-group alliance vs. other
groupings, etc. Normally the two houses of the state legislature
operate on a quid-pro-quo basis-you take care of your districts
and we'll take care of ours. The hope of advancement (to the
State Senate or to Congress) may be present in the aspirations of
some, but the vast majority of legislators are concerned with their
own bailiwicks. The party may be the integrative force to channel
personal interests into a package that appears to be a party measure
but in esence is composed of the desires of individual incumbents.
In the legislature the power structure, whether party or pressure-
group in nature, must be very careful with a reapportionment
measure because the aim is to perpetuate its base. Naturally that
interest tends to orient toward the status quo, though sometimes the
leadership attempts, to eliminae the noncooperators or, in a more
subtle fashion, to send them off to Washington.
When the state legislature undertakes a Congressional reappor-
tionment the involvement is more remote. It is generally recog-
nized that Congressional districts are the business of Congressmen,
in the same quid-pro-quo manner mentioned above. Besides, the
advantages of seniority in the national legislature are acknowl-
edged. Some state legislators may aspire to Congressional posi-
tions, but their number is slight. Furthermore, the opportunities
are not great in states with large numbers of state legislators and
few Congressional seats. In California the ratio of opportunity is
greater, but in 1967 the interest was limited.
The reapportioners are therefore personally less interested in
the Congressional reapportionment, and they allow a political
vacuum to exist. The legislators are content to let someone else
put the package together. Inasmuch as people voting on the
measure are seldom personally involved, the party may be the
integrative device for teamwork. Because the affected (Congress-
men) are not voting, the organizer has more freedom for party
action and manipulation. In other words, the district can be
reshaped on the basis of interests other than the district's own;
hence, the Republicans in the 1950s and the Democrats in the 1960s
were able to better protect their Congressional seats.
If the disinterest of the state legislators allows a leader to pack-
age a party program, it also allows a Congressional delegation to
organize for making its wants known. If a strong party organization
exists, the incumbents' interests may be secondary but, needless
to say, strong parties do not exist in California. Individual districts
tend to be feudal domains of incumbents who identify themselves
by party names but who operate independently. Where strong
pressure-group alliances dominate the political life of a state, the
interest is on the state legislature level, not so much on the Con-
gressional level; hence again an opportunity for a Congressional
delegation initiative. Also the state legislative leadership may be
more effective in the major realignments following the census or
when strongly in control. In 1965 the state legislative leadership
was able to disregard Congressional desires, but in 1967 the pre-
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carious balance between parties and branches of government in
California offered a new game. The Congressional delegation was
ready.
A Delegation in Action: It is notable that in 1967 (and 1965) a
large congressional delegation, reflecting a multitude of attitudes,
presented a program that was largely adopted after many months
of effort. The key was a definite program-the Congressional dele-
gation's program-that somewhat protected them from the whims
of state legislators three thousand miles away.
As in the case of any reapportionment (or any bill), someone
must take the initiative to organize support. In this instance
Congressman Burton played a decisive role. His badgering forced
action, not always in line with his desires; indeed, reaction against
his ideas was common; nonetheless there was action. In 1967
leadership and direction became diffused at the expense of efficiency
and intelligence. At times many participants may have wondered
whether there would be any culmination. Certainly some were
doing their best to prevent action.
From today's view it should be apparent that the program made
it possible for the Congresional delegation to get most of what it
wanted. A careful perusal of lines (from the several plans) shows
that the Congressional proposal was basic all the way. Possibly
this is best demonstrated by the Kern County line in the 27th
C.D. That line was fundamental to control of the ripple from
north to south, and most programs followed it from 1965 onward.
As concisely as possible the Congressional delegation, with the
exception of a few endrunners who sought other channels of in-
fluence, was saying, "This is what we want." As a unit, the
bipartisan delegation was more effective than might have been
thirty-eight separate pleas handled by someone in Sacramento.
What would have happened if the Congressional delegation had
not been prepared? Well, someone would have filled the vacuum-
the Speaker, the Republican Party leadership, the court, or some
other integrative force. This may have been what some people
hoped for, but the Congressional delegation in its own way outfoxed
the foxes.
CONCLUSION
Many articles have sought to analyze re-districting actions from
the court case viewpoint and/or from the statistical perspective.
The conclusions have often been that poor or good legal precedent
was followed or that the variation of district population was too
great or better than the previous pattern, or to put the situation
in the crazy quilt context, the patches do or don't make an aesthetic
pattern, or the pieces vary considerably in size or are about equal.
This article has sought to approach the redistricting process from
several perspectives how a bill was created; what the pressures
and desires of the political actors were, and; how the governmental
system responded to the legal challenges. Most of the potential
agents of authority in California got into the act-The congressmen,
the Governor, the state legislators, the judges, and even the bu-
reaucrats. Each participant had his turn at the quilt and fulfilled
his role as he saw it-generally from his own viewpoint and with
his own comfort in mind. The result may be a crazy quilt from a
legal evaluation, but what can one expect from a quilting bee? If
the courts undertake their own redistricting program with the as-
sistance of computers and objective criteria the product may not
be a crazy quilt, but will the mechanically contrived designs be
more pleasing to the eye?
